Game justification of the rule of self-consistent choice
This paper considers the game justification of the rule of self-consistent choice offered by the author earlier. For this purpose game models are used like ``dollar division, including \(m\) \((m>1)\) arbitrators and \(n\) \((n>2)\) players with the dependent sets of strategies. Two models are considered in which opinions of the arbitrators are represented by the profile of binary relations and the players are characterized by the vector of their claims. One model is based on special properties (connections and antisymmetry) of the profile of the binary relations. The other model considers the case of arbitrary relations, but it requires the introduction of additional hypothesis about the type of a scalar criterion assessing favourable outcomes of pairwise comparisons of players.
- Justifying optimal play via consistency
- Consistency of decisions in a hierarchy of games
- The consistency principle for games in strategic form
- On the concepts of rationalizability in games
- Exploiting Game Theory for Analysing Justifications
- The Consistent Preferences Approach to Deductive Reasoning in Games
- Rationalizability in continuous games
- Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players
- Subjective rationalizability in hypergames
- Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian games
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