The Consistent Preferences Approach to Deductive Reasoning in Games

DOI10.1007/978-0-387-26237-6MaRDI QIDQ5479626zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Geir B. Asheim

Publication date 10 July 2006

Published in Theory and Decision Library C (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-26237-6

zbMATH Keywords

belief operatorsconsistent preferencesepistemic modelNash equilibriumproper consistencyproper equilibriumquasi-perfect equilibriumrationalizabilitysequential equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18) Decision theory for games (91A35) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

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Cited in

(11)

• Dynamic psychological games
• An epistemic characterization of MACA
• Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning
• Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
• An epistemic approach to stochastic games
• A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies
• Preference-based belief operators
• Game justification of the rule of self-consistent choice
• Epistemically robust strategy subsets
• Time inconsistency and second-order beliefs over types in extensive-form games
• Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability

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