Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory

DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0376-8MaRDI QIDQ2248909zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel Monte

Publication date 27 June 2014

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0376-8

zbMATH Keywords

automatonbounded memorycommitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• A comment on the absent-minded driver paradox
• A Theory of Credibility
• Bounded memory and biases in information processing
• Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• More absentmindedness
• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
• Rationality and bounded rationality
• The absent-minded driver
• The strength of a little perfection

Cited in

(6)

• Learning, bounded memory, and inertia
• Bounded memory, inertia, sampling and weighting model for market entry games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3902437 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3976704 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning with bounded memory in games
• Cooperation and bounded recall

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