Limits to rational learning

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.08.001MaRDI QIDQ893386zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yehuda Levy

Publication date 19 November 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:4155f14d-6684-495a-9001-a7afc604eda8

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumrepeated gamesrational learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3179081 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 835835 (Why is no real title available?)
• Bayesian Representation of Stochastic Processes under Learning: de Finetti Revisited
• Bayesian learning and convergence to Nash equilibria without common priors
• Bayesian learning in normal form games
• Bayesian learning in repeated games
• Compatible Measures and Merging
• Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence to Nash equilibrium: The almost absolute continuity hypothesis
• On equivalence of infinite product measures
• Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Repeated large games with incomplete information
• Subjective games and equilibria
• The role of absolute continuity in merging of opinions and rational learning
• Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria

Cited in

(6)

• Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory
• Learning under limited information.
• Strategy constrained by cognitive limits, and the rationality of belief-revision policies
• Bayesian learning behaviour and the stability of equilibrium forecasts
• The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games
• Limits on power and rationality

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