Linear programming and Vickrey auctions
It is known that implementing the Vickrey sealed bid auction with \(n\) bidders requires to solve \(n+1\) optimization problems. The authors find a relationship between these auctions and duality in linear programming. They show how to use this relation to produce iterative auctions which implement the Vickrey solution. Thus they reduce the complexity of the original problem from \(n+1\) to \(n=2\) optimization problems. It is proved that the appropriate dual variables correspond to the agent's marginal products. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0983.00063].
- Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
- Mechanism design for land acquisition
- Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
- Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
- Combinatorial auctions
- The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions
- Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
- Efficient advert assignment
- Iterative auction design for tree valuations
- Bounding the payment of approximate truthful mechanisms
- Buyer-supplier games: optimization over the core
- Towards fast Vickrey pricing using constraint programming
- On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
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