Manipulative auction design

DOI10.3982/TE687MaRDI QIDQ3006636zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Philippe Jehiel

Publication date 20 June 2011

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/TE687

zbMATH Keywords

manipulationanalogy-based expectation equilibriumauction design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Auctions with untrustworthy bidders
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Cited in

(11)

• Feedback design in games with ambiguity-averse players
• Knowing me, imagining you: projection and overbidding in auctions
• Strategic interpretations
• An experiment on learning in a multiple games environment
• Auctions with resale: reserve prices and revenues
• The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions
• Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium
• Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions
• Manipulations in contests
• Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions
• First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders

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