May's theorem in a rectilinear spatial model
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Cites work
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A spatial analogue of May's theorem
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3405712 (Why is no real title available?)
- May's theorem in an infinite setting
- May's theorem with an infinite population
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
- POSITIVELY RESPONSIVE COLLECTIVE CHOICE RULES AND MAJORITY RULE: A GENERALIZATION OF MAY'S THEOREM TO MANY ALTERNATIVES
- Spatial implementation
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
- Update monotone preference rules
- Voting under constraints
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