Mechanism design for set cover games when elements are agents

DOI10.1007/11496199_39MaRDI QIDQ5710136zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Zheng Sun, Weizhao Wang, Xiaowen Chu, Xiangyang Li

Publication date 30 November 2005

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/b137095

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Distributed algorithms (68W15) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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• Bounding the payment of approximate truthful mechanisms
• Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
• Cost allocation and strategyproof mechanism for cover-set games

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