Mixed equilibria in runoff elections

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.09.002MaRDI QIDQ485818zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dimitrios Xefteris

Publication date 14 January 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

Hotelling-Downsmixed strategiesrunoff voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
• Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria
• The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting
• The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model

Cited in

(10)

• Mixed equilibrium in a pure location game: the case of \(n\geq 4\) firms
• Many-candidate Nash equilibria for elections involving random selection
• Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections
• Interpretation of electoral mixed strategies
• Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
• Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
• Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants
• Campaign contributions and policy divergence
• The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting
• Stability in electoral competition: a case for multiple votes

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