Optimal crowdsourcing contests

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.09.001MaRDI QIDQ1735735zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Balasubramanian Sivan

Publication date 29 March 2019

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1111.2893

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionapproximationBayes-Nash equilibriumcrowdsourcing contest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Abstract: We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to enter. Unlike all-pay auctions where a usual design objective would be to maximize revenue, in crowdsourcing contests, the principal only benefits from the submission with the highest quality. We give a theory for optimal crowdsourcing contests that mirrors the theory of optimal auction design: the optimal crowdsourcing contest is a virtual valuation optimizer (the virtual valuation function depends on the distribution of contestant skills and the number of contestants). We also compare crowdsourcing contests with more conventional means of procurement. In this comparison, crowdsourcing contests are relatively disadvantaged because the effort of losing contestants is wasted. Nonetheless, we show that crowdsourcing contests are 2-approximations to conventional methods for a large family of "regular" distributions, and 4-approximations, otherwise.

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Cites work

• Contest architecture
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5485518 (Why is no real title available?)
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
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• The all-pay auction with complete information

Cited in

(22)

• Centralized vs decentralized contests
• Crowdsourcing contests
• Optimal crowdfunding design
• Contests with dominant strategies
• Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information
• Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests
• Adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets: bandit algorithms for repeated principal-agent problems
• Optimal crowdsourcing contests
• Crowdsourcing contests with entry cost
• On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result
• Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
• The contest game for crowdsourcing reviews
• Choosing a self-built or an intermediary platform for hosting winner-take-all crowdsourcing contests?
• Sequential elimination in multi-stage all-pay auctions
• Costly information providing in binary contests
• Restricting entries to all-pay contests
• Contest design with threshold objectives
• Competition among parallel contests
• A Myersonian framework for optimal liquidity provision in automated market makers
• The contest game for crowdsourcing reviews
• From monopoly to competition: when do optimal contests prevail?
• All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values

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