Pricing and coordination: Strategically stable equilibria

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90025-PMaRDI QIDQ1193753zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors S. Singh

Publication date 27 September 1992

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90025-p

zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemmacoordination gamestable setstwo-period games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 509223
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7500541
• Coordination in Oligopoly
• Prisoners' dilemma in duopoly (super) games

Cites work

• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Pricing and coordination: Strategically stable equilibria
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
• Stable equilibria and forward induction

Cited in

(12)

• Robust pricing under strategic trading
• AN EQUILIBRIUM GUIDE TO DESIGNING AFFINE PRICING MODELS
• Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
• Convergence of strategic behavior to price taking
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Strategic bidding in price coupled regions
• Coordination of Pricing and Multiple-Period Production Across Multiple Constant Priced Goods
• Existence of coordinating prices in dynamic systems
• Equilibria in a dynamic model of coordination of two firms with nonfixed prices
• On the possibility of price wars when firms use a `tit-for-tat' strategy
• Sustainable positive profit multiple-price strategies in contestable markets
• Pricing and coordination: Strategically stable equilibria

This page was built for publication: Pricing and coordination: Strategically stable equilibria

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1193753)