Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.07.005MaRDI QIDQ6176747zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mengling Li, Yohanes E. Riyanto, M. H. Xu

Publication date 23 August 2023

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.005

zbMATH Keywords

compatibility constraintlaboratory experimentmarket designorgan donationpriority rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule
• Organ donation with vouchers
• How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange
• Fairness, efficiency, and flexibility in organ allocation for kidney transplantation
• Kidney Exchange

Cites work

• Affirmative Action in India via Vertical, Horizontal, and Overlapping Reservations
• Dual-donor organ exchange
• Dynamic allocation of stochastically-arriving flexible resources to random streams of objects with application to kidney cross-transplantation
• Equilibrium Allocations Under Alternative Waitlist Designs: Evidence From Deceased Donor Kidneys
• Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools
• Fairness, efficiency, and flexibility in organ allocation for kidney transplantation
• Kidney Exchange
• Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants
• Matching in Dynamic Imbalanced Markets
• Maximizing the Efficiency of the U.S. Liver Allocation System Through Region Design
• On matching and thickness in heterogeneous dynamic markets
• Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule
• Organ donation with vouchers
• Pairwise kidney exchange over the blood group barrier
• Recipient choice can address the efficiency-equity trade-off in kidney transplantation: a mechanism design model
• Regular type distributions in mechanism design and -concavity

Cited in

(8)

• Organ donation with vouchers
• Efficiency in lung transplant allocation strategies
• A decision-rule for transplanting non-cadaveric organs
• Channel choice and incentives in the cadaveric organ supply chain
• Maximizing the Efficiency of the U.S. Liver Allocation System Through Region Design
• A Broader View of Designing the Liver Allocation System
• An intelligent system for prioritisation of organ transplant patient waiting lists using fuzzy logic
• Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule

This page was built for publication: Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6176747)