A shelf-space-dependent wholesale price when manufacturer and retailer brands compete
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3363370 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Mathematical Model for Simultaneously Determining the Optimal Brand-Collection and Display-Area Allocation
- A time-consistent open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium of shelf-space allocation
- An efficient algorithm to allocate shelf space
- Channel coordination over time: Incentive equilibria and credibility
- Incentive strategies for shelf-space allocation in duopolies
- Product selection and space allocation in supermarkets
- SHELF-SPACE ALLOCATION AND ADVERTISING DECISIONS IN THE MARKETING CHANNEL: A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH
Cited in
(6)- The role of store brand positioning for appropriating supply chain profit under shelf space allocation
- Managing brand competition with consumer fairness concern via manufacturer incentive
- Shelf-space allocation of national and private brands
- Competing with channel partners: supply chain conflict when retailers introduce store brands
- Suppliers' competition and manufacturer's product mix: the role of ingredient brand
- Introduction of store brands considering product cost and shelf space opportunity cost
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