Are Retailers’ Private Labels Always Detrimental to National Brand Manufacturers? A Differential Game Perspective

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_3zbMath1504.91118OpenAlexW2958385773MaRDI QIDQ5057951

Alessandra Buratto, Sihem Taboubi

Publication date: 1 December 2022

Published in: Trends in Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_3

zbMATH Keywords

differential gameschannelsfeedback Stackelberg equilibriumprivate labels

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Pricing and advertising of private and national brands in a dynamic marketing channel
• A dynamic model for advertising and pricing competition between national and store brands
• Fighting store brands through the strategic timing of pricing and advertising decisions
• Interaction between channel strategy and store brand decisions
• Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium strategies when the private label competes with the national brand

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