Are Retailers’ Private Labels Always Detrimental to National Brand Manufacturers? A Differential Game Perspective
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Publication:5057951
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_3zbMath1504.91118OpenAlexW2958385773MaRDI QIDQ5057951
Alessandra Buratto, Sihem Taboubi
Publication date: 1 December 2022
Published in: Trends in Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_3
Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
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- Pricing and advertising of private and national brands in a dynamic marketing channel
- A dynamic model for advertising and pricing competition between national and store brands
- Fighting store brands through the strategic timing of pricing and advertising decisions
- Interaction between channel strategy and store brand decisions
- Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium strategies when the private label competes with the national brand
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