Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium strategies when the private label competes with the national brand
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Publication:2271815
DOI10.1007/S10479-008-0320-7zbMATH Open1170.91313OpenAlexW2031435014MaRDI QIDQ2271815FDOQ2271815
Authors: Nawel Amrouche, Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Georges Zaccour
Publication date: 4 August 2009
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-008-0320-7
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Cites Work
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- CONTINUOUS FEEDBACK CONTROL STRATEGY WITH MAXIMAL CAPTURE ZONE IN A CLASS OF PURSUIT GAMES
- Leader-following dynamic game of new product diffusion
Cited In (26)
- Feedback Nash equilibrium for dynamic brand and channel advertising in dual channel supply chain
- Dynamic matching in cloud manufacturing considering matching costs
- Direct marketing of an event under hazards of customer saturation and forgetting
- Quality improvement vs. advertising support: which strategy works better for a manufacturer?
- A Stackelberg differential game theoretic approach for analyzing coordination strategies in a supply chain with retailer's premium store brand
- Information advantage and payment disadvantage when selling goods through a powerful retailer
- Pricing and advertising of private and national brands in a dynamic marketing channel
- Feedback Stackelberg-Nash equilibria in mixed leadership games with an application to cooperative advertising
- Optimal advertising decisions for promoting retail and online channels in a dynamic framework
- Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in an advertising game with interference
- Intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Stackelberg equilibria
- Competition in defensive and offensive advertising strategies in a segmented market
- Market entry strategy in the presence of market spillovers and efficiency differentiation
- Optimal dynamic advertising with an adverse exogenous effect on brand goodwill
- Recent developments in dynamic advertising research
- Partial myopia vs. forward-looking behaviors in a dynamic pricing and replenishment model for perishable items
- A time-consistent open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium of shelf-space allocation
- A goodwill model with predatory advertising
- Advertising and exogenous interference in a segmented market
- Environmental collaboration in a closed-loop supply chain with a reverse revenue sharing contract
- Asymmetric information in a capital accumulation differential game with spillover and learning effects
- Advertising strategies in a differential game with negative competitor's interference
- A dynamic model for advertising and pricing competition between national and store brands
- Existence and uniqueness of optimal dynamic pricing and advertising controls without concavity
- Are Retailers’ Private Labels Always Detrimental to National Brand Manufacturers? A Differential Game Perspective
- Joint optimal pricing and advertising policies in a fashion supply chain under the ODM strategy considering fashion level and goodwill
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