Information advantage and payment disadvantage when selling goods through a powerful retailer

DOI10.1007/S10479-020-03889-XMaRDI QIDQ6148728zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Baozhuang Niu, Zifan Shen, Qiyang Li

Publication date 8 February 2024

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-020-03889-x

zbMATH Keywords

account periodcash opportunity costchannel competitioninformation valueretailing strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• Contracting and Information Sharing Under Supply Chain Competition
• Dollar vs. percentage markup pricing schemes under a dominant retailer
• Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
• Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium strategies when the private label competes with the national brand
• Four payment models for the multi-mode resource constrained project scheduling problem with discounted cash flows
• Impact of power structure on supply chain performance and consumer surplus
• Interaction between channel strategy and store brand decisions
• Outsourcing management under various demand information sharing scenarios
• Pricing policies under direct vs. indirect channel competition and national vs. store brand competition
• Supply chain interactions due to store-brand introductions: the impact of retail competition
• The impact of manufacturer's encroachment and nonlinear production cost on retailer's information sharing decisions
• Trade credit insurance, capital constraint, and the behavior of manufacturers and banks
• When should a manufacturer share truthful manufacturing cost information with a dominant retailer?

Cited in

(1)

• A Stackelberg differential game theoretic approach for analyzing coordination strategies in a supply chain with retailer's premium store brand

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