The Aumann-Shapley price mechanism for allocating congestion costs
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Publication:1604051
DOI10.1016/S0167-6377(01)00096-7zbMath0993.90027OpenAlexW2027210868MaRDI QIDQ1604051
Publication date: 3 July 2002
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-6377(01)00096-7
Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Applications of queueing theory (congestion, allocation, storage, traffic, etc.) (60K30)
Related Items (10)
Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case ⋮ Applied cost allocation: the DEA-Aumann-Shapley approach ⋮ An optimal congestion and cost-sharing pricing scheme for multiclass services ⋮ Cooperative networks games with elastic demands ⋮ The concert queueing game: to wait or to be late ⋮ Bertrand equilibria and efficiency in markets for congestible network services ⋮ A fair staff allocation rule for the capacity pooling of multiple call centers ⋮ Cost Sharing in Production Economies ⋮ A survey on networking games in telecommunications ⋮ On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing
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