Vertical separation as a defense against strong suppliers

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2013.01.037zbMath1332.91073OpenAlexW3122652239MaRDI QIDQ257263

Noriaki Matsushima, Tomomichi Mizuno

Publication date: 15 March 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13732

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingdisintegrationeconomicsdouble marginalizationmultiple inputsorganization theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Related Items (3)

Asymmetric product distribution between symmetric manufacturers using dual-channel supply chains ⋮ Optimal tariffs with endogenous vertical structure: uniform versus discriminatory tariffs ⋮ When should a manufacturer set its direct price and wholesale price in dual-channel supply chains?

Cites Work

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• A note on competitive supply chains with generalised supply costs
• Equilibrium analysis of supply chain structures under power imbalance
• Bargaining in competing supply chains with uncertainty
• Interactions between numbers of a marketing-production channel under seasonal demand
• Marketing-production coordination in channels of distribution
• Industry profits and competition under bilateral oligopoly
• Strategic upfront marketing channel integration as an entry barrier
• Price competition with integrated and decentralized supply chains
• Logit Demand Estimation Under Competitive Pricing Behavior: An Equilibrium Framework
• The Make-or-Buy Decision in the Presence of a Rival: Strategic Outsourcing to a Common Supplier

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