Vertical separation as a defense against strong suppliers
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Publication:257263
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2013.01.037zbMath1332.91073OpenAlexW3122652239MaRDI QIDQ257263
Noriaki Matsushima, Tomomichi Mizuno
Publication date: 15 March 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13732
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)
Related Items (3)
Asymmetric product distribution between symmetric manufacturers using dual-channel supply chains ⋮ Optimal tariffs with endogenous vertical structure: uniform versus discriminatory tariffs ⋮ When should a manufacturer set its direct price and wholesale price in dual-channel supply chains?
Cites Work
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- Logit Demand Estimation Under Competitive Pricing Behavior: An Equilibrium Framework
- The Make-or-Buy Decision in the Presence of a Rival: Strategic Outsourcing to a Common Supplier
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