Vertical separation as a defense against strong suppliers

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2013.01.037zbMATH Open1332.91073OpenAlexW3122652239MaRDI QIDQ257263FDOQ257263

Authors: Noriaki Matsushima, Tomomichi Mizuno 

Publication date: 15 March 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13732

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zbMATH Keywords

bargainingdisintegrationdouble marginalizationeconomicsmultiple inputsorganization theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Cites Work

• Bargaining in competing supply chains with uncertainty
• Interactions between numbers of a marketing-production channel under seasonal demand
• Marketing-production coordination in channels of distribution
• Industry profits and competition under bilateral oligopoly
• Strategic upfront marketing channel integration as an entry barrier
• Price competition with integrated and decentralized supply chains
• Logit demand estimation under competitive pricing behavior: An equilibrium framework
• The make-or-buy decision in the presence of a rival: strategic outsourcing to a common supplier
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A note on competitive supply chains with generalised supply costs
• Equilibrium analysis of supply chain structures under power imbalance

Cited In (4)

• Vertical separation with location-price competition
• Optimal tariffs with endogenous vertical structure: uniform versus discriminatory tariffs
• Asymmetric product distribution between symmetric manufacturers using dual-channel supply chains
• When should a manufacturer set its direct price and wholesale price in dual-channel supply chains?

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