Vertical separation as a defense against strong suppliers

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2013.01.037MaRDI QIDQ257263zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Noriaki Matsushima, Tomomichi Mizuno

Publication date 15 March 2016

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13732

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingdisintegrationdouble marginalizationeconomicsmultiple inputsorganization theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Recommendations

• Vertical product differentiation and entry deterrence
• Vertical separation with location-price competition
• Two-sided competition with vertical differentiation
• Vertical product differentiation and two-sided markets
• Manufacturer encroachment and product assortment under vertical differentiation
• Core existence in vertically differentiated markets
• Endogenous vertical segmentation in a Cournot oligopoly
• Vertical integration as a source of hold-up
• Product differentiation in a vertical structure

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1323215 (Why is no real title available?)
• A note on competitive supply chains with generalised supply costs
• Bargaining in competing supply chains with uncertainty
• Equilibrium analysis of supply chain structures under power imbalance
• Industry profits and competition under bilateral oligopoly
• Interactions between numbers of a marketing-production channel under seasonal demand
• Logit demand estimation under competitive pricing behavior: An equilibrium framework
• Marketing-production coordination in channels of distribution
• Price competition with integrated and decentralized supply chains
• Strategic upfront marketing channel integration as an entry barrier
• The make-or-buy decision in the presence of a rival: strategic outsourcing to a common supplier

Cited in

(4)

• Vertical separation with location-price competition
• Optimal tariffs with endogenous vertical structure: uniform versus discriminatory tariffs
• Asymmetric product distribution between symmetric manufacturers using dual-channel supply chains
• When should a manufacturer set its direct price and wholesale price in dual-channel supply chains?

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