scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4012306
[For the entire collection see Zbl 0616.00006.] This paper considers the problem of a firm choosing optimal quality and advertising strategies under asymmetric information about the offert product quality. Only consumers, who have bought the product, can evaluate the true quality. Other consumers take advertising as a quality signal. Therefore consumer preferences are differentely evaluated dependent on product experience. This gives incentives for the firm choosing special strategies. Under special assumptions it can be shown that it is optimal to enter the market with a low quality product offering a low price and choosing a high advertising budget. As time goes on the producer should increase quality and price but decrease advertising.
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