On -roughly weighted games

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Publication:403979

DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0402-XzbMATH Open1304.91021arXiv1112.2861OpenAlexW2069561241MaRDI QIDQ403979FDOQ403979

Sascha Kurz, Josep Freixas

Publication date: 29 August 2014

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Gvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko (2011) have introduced three hierarchies for simple games in order to measure the distance of a given simple game to the class of (roughly) weighted voting games. Their third class mathcalCalpha consists of all simple games permitting a weighted representation such that each winning coalition has a weight of at least 1 and each losing coalition a weight of at most alpha. For a given game the minimal possible value of alpha is called its critical threshold value. We continue the work on the critical threshold value, initiated by Gvozdeva et al., and contribute some new results on the possible values for a given number of voters as well as some general bounds for restricted subclasses of games. A strong relation beween this concept and the cost of stability, i.e. the minimum amount of external payment to ensure stability in a coalitional game, is uncovered.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1112.2861





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