Accuracy and epistemic conservatism

DOI10.1093/ANALYS/ANY094zbMATH Open1497.03028OpenAlexW2912459983WikidataQ128709921 ScholiaQ128709921MaRDI QIDQ5046243FDOQ5046243

Authors: Florian Steinberger 

Publication date: 28 October 2022

Published in: Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/any094

Recommendations

• Repugnant accuracy
• Accuracy monism and doxastic dominance: reply to Steinberger
• A modesty proposal
• Ideal counterpart theorizing and the accuracy argument for probabilism
• Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Cited In (8)

• Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief
• Attitudes toward epistemic risk and the value of experiments
• Repugnant accuracy
• Accuracy monism and doxastic dominance: reply to Steinberger
• Accurate believers are deductively cogent
• A modesty proposal
• Epistemic values and the value of learning
• What accuracy could not be

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