Doomsday equilibria for omega-regular games

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Publication:528193

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-54013-4_5zbMATH Open1370.68164arXiv1311.3238OpenAlexW2548450637MaRDI QIDQ528193FDOQ528193


Authors: Krishnendu Chatterjee, Laurent Doyen, Emmanuel Filiot, Jean-François Raskin Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 12 May 2017

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Information and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Two-player games on graphs provide the theoretical frame- work for many important problems such as reactive synthesis. While the traditional study of two-player zero-sum games has been extended to multi-player games with several notions of equilibria, they are decidable only for perfect-information games, whereas several applications require imperfect-information games. In this paper we propose a new notion of equilibria, called doomsday equilibria, which is a strategy profile such that all players satisfy their own objective, and if any coalition of players deviates and violates even one of the players objective, then the objective of every player is violated. We present algorithms and complexity results for deciding the existence of doomsday equilibria for various classes of omega-regular objectives, both for imperfect-information games, and for perfect-information games. We provide optimal complexity bounds for imperfect-information games, and in most cases for perfect-information games.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.3238




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