Game of banks -- biform game theoretical framework for ATM network cost sharing
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Publication:6565462
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2024.02.036MaRDI QIDQ6565462FDOQ6565462
Authors: Tri-Dung Nguyen 
Publication date: 2 July 2024
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
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- Worst-case equilibria
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- Potential games
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- Multilinear Extensions of Games
- Setting the right incentives for global planning and operations
- Biform games
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- A multi‐objective model for bank ATM networks
- Some theorems on distribution functions.
- Cost allocation in a bank ATM network.
- Cooperation and competition in inventory games
- Endogenous formation of cooperation structures
- Surplus division and investment incentives in supply chains: a biform-game analysis
- Competition and cooperation in linear production and sequencing processes
- On the Shapley value of liability games
- Applying the Shapley value to the tuna fishery
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