Game of banks -- biform game theoretical framework for ATM network cost sharing
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Publication:6565462
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139280 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5145289 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1323118 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Shapley value representation of potential games
- A multi‐objective model for bank ATM networks
- Applying the Shapley value to the tuna fishery
- Biform games
- Competition and cooperation in linear production and sequencing processes
- Cooperation and competition in inventory games
- Cost allocation in a bank ATM network.
- Endogenous formation of cooperation structures
- Multilinear Extensions of Games
- On the Shapley value of liability games
- Potential games
- Setting the right incentives for global planning and operations
- Some theorems on distribution functions.
- Surplus division and investment incentives in supply chains: a biform-game analysis
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- Worst-case equilibria
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