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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3991198 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1066239 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3992265 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence
- A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption
- On the Transversality Condition in Infinite Horizon Optimal Problems
- On the stability and potential cyclicity of corruption in governments subject to popularity constraints
- Optimal allocation of drug control efforts: A differential game analysis
Cited in
(19)- Leading bureaucracies to the tipping point: an alternative model of multiple stable equilibrium levels of corruption
- Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary
- Complex dynamics in a growth model with corruption in public procurement
- The emergence of deontological codes in public administration
- Petty corruption
- OPTIMAL GROWTH, DEBT, CORRUPTION, AND R&D
- Fear induced explosive transitions in the dynamics of corruption
- Wheels and cycles: Suboptimality and volatility of corrupted economies
- The incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development
- Corruption and Firms
- On the cultural transmission of corruption
- Cracking down on bribery
- Corruption across countries and regions: some consequences of local osmosis
- On Corruption and Institutions in Decentralized Economies
- A dynamic analysis of Schelling's binary corruption model: a competitive equilibrium approach
- Some implications of the unofficial economy-bureaucratic corruption relationship in transition countries
- The power of voting and corruption cycles
- Mean-field-game model of corruption
- Political corruption and public activism: an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis
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