Violations of belief persistence in Dempster-Shafer equilibrium

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0880zbMATH Open1013.91025OpenAlexW2066069433MaRDI QIDQ700132FDOQ700132

Authors: Matthew J. Ryan 

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0880

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zbMATH Keywords

Choquet expected utilitysignaling gamesDempster-Shafer equilibriumbelief presistenceDempster-Shafer rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Robust Statistics
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• Knowledge in flux. Modeling the dynamics of epistemic states
• Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty: Breaking down backward induction
• Updating ambiguous beliefs
• Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players
• Capacities and probabilistic beliefs: a precarious coexistence
• Education signalling and uncertainty

Cited In (3)

• Non-additive anonymous games
• Frequentist belief update under ambiguous evidence in social networks
• Coherent Dempster-Shafer equilibrium and ambiguous signals

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