Games of fixed rank: a hierarchy of bimatrix games
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Publication:847799
DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0436-2zbMATH Open1202.91007arXivcs/0511021OpenAlexW3136147237MaRDI QIDQ847799FDOQ847799
Authors: Thorsten Theobald, R. Kannan
Publication date: 19 February 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We propose a new hierarchical approach to understand the complexity of the open problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game. Specifically, we investigate a hierarchy of bimatrix games which results from restricting the rank of the matrix to be of fixed rank at most . For every fixed , this class strictly generalizes the class of zero-sum games, but is a very special case of general bimatrix games. We show that even for the set of Nash equilibria of these games can consist of an arbitrarily large number of connected components. While the question of exact polynomial time algorithms to find a Nash equilibrium remains open for games of fixed rank, we can provide polynomial time algorithms for finding an -approximation.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0511021
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