Recall in extensive form games

DOI10.1007/S001820050099MaRDI QIDQ1293482zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Klaus Ritzberger

Publication date 14 June 2000

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050099

zbMATH Keywords

extensive form gamesperfect recall

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory for games (91A35) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Recommendations

• Characterizations of perfect recall
• Memory and perfect recall in extensive games
• Complete inflation and perfect recall in extensive games
• A characterization of von Neumann games in terms of memory
• Players' information in extensive games

Cited in

(11)

• Characterizations of perfect recall
• Memory and perfect recall in extensive games
• Information flows and memory in games
• Complete inflation and perfect recall in extensive games
• Backward induction in games without perfect recall
• Behavior strategies, mixed strategies and perfect recall
• Kuhn's equivalence theorem for games in product form
• Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
• A characterization of von Neumann games in terms of memory
• On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets
• Equivalences among five game specifications, including a new specification whose nodes are sets of past choices

This page was built for publication: Recall in extensive form games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1293482)