Repeated bargaining with reference-dependent preferences

DOI10.1007/S00182-010-0253-7MaRDI QIDQ637581zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kyle Hyndman

Publication date 6 September 2011

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0253-7

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingreference points

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence
• Endogenous reference points in bargaining
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• Bargaining with history-dependent preferences

Cites work

• Bargaining with history-dependent preferences
• Comparison utility in a growth model
• Moral property rights in bargaining with infeasible claims
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

Cited in

(9)

• Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence
• Replication invariance of bargaining solutions
• Endogenous reference points in bargaining
• Subgame perfect equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining game with loss aversion
• Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining
• Repeated bargaining with persistent private information
• Reference points and negative reciprocity in simple sequential games.
• Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining
• Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion

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