Loss aversion and bargaining
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Cited in
(18)- Fairness motivation in bargaining: a matter of principle
- Equilibrium notions for agents with cumulative prospect theory preferences
- Power or loss aversion? Reinterpreting the bargaining weights in search and matching models
- Endogenous reference points in bargaining
- Risk aversion for losses and the Nash bargaining solution
- Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence
- Credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibrium for bimatrix games with triangular fuzzy payoffs
- Bargaining over losses
- Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining
- Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation
- The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution with loss aversion
- Non-acceptance of Losses—An Experimental Study on the Importance of the Sign of Final Outcomes in Ultimatum Bargaining
- A revealed reference point for prospect theory
- Subgame perfect equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining game with loss aversion
- A tale of two bargaining solutions
- Repeated bargaining with reference-dependent preferences
- Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion
- Loss aversion equilibrium
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