Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents

DOI10.2307/2297482MaRDI QIDQ3765522zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Drew Fudenberg, David M. Kreps

Publication date 1987

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64014

zbMATH Keywords

market entrysequential equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cited in

(6)

• Reputation and the evolution of conflict
• Multiple rounds in a chain store game
• Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
• Reputational bargaining with external resolution opportunities
• Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
• When is reputation bad?

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