Robust competitive auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.09.031MaRDI QIDQ1667909zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Seungjin Han

Publication date 31 August 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.031

zbMATH Keywords

competing mechanism designcompetitive auctionsrobust equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
• Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
• Competitive auctions
• Optimality and robustness of the English auction
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms

Cites work

• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence
• Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices

Cited in

(6)

• Sellers' implicit collusion in directed search markets
• On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
• General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment
• Principal-agent VCG contracts
• Robust optimization strategies for seller based on uncertainty sets in context of sequential auction
• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions

This page was built for publication: Robust competitive auctions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1667909)