Simple, optimal and efficient auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_10MaRDI QIDQ3102584zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Constantinos Daskalakis, George Pierrakos

Publication date 5 December 2011

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_10

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(16)

• Efficiency of lowest-unmatched price auctions
• Implementing the efficient auction: initial results from the lab
• Separation between second price auctions with personalized reserves and the revenue optimal auction
• Strictly strategy-proof auctions
• Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition
• A lower bound on seller revenue in single buyer monopoly auctions
• Vickrey auctions for irregular distributions
• Pricing to maximize revenue and welfare simultaneously in large markets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5296347 (Why is no real title available?)
• Prediction and welfare in ad auctions
• Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
• Simple and nearly optimal multi-item auctions
• Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions
• Regret minimization for reserve prices in second-price auctions
• On efficiency of the English auction
• Discrete and Bayesian transaction fee mechanisms

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