Some further characterizations for the forgotten voting rules
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Recommendations
- A characterization for qualified majority voting rules
- Some Remarks on Dodgson's Voting Rule
- REMARKS ON A PROCEDURAL CONDITION FOR THE VOTING PARADOX
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting
- On some incompatible properties of voting schemes
- The nonmanipulative vote-deficits of voting rules
- On some paradoxes in voting theory
- Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
- An extension of the Moulin no show paradox for voting correspondences
Cites work
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Consistency of decision processes
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- Majority decisions based on difference of votes
- The forgotten decision rules: majority rules based on difference of votes
Cited in
(12)- A characterization of majority voting rules with quorums
- Beyond neutrality: extended difference of votes rules
- Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness
- Quota rules for incomplete judgments
- The forgotten decision rules: majority rules based on difference of votes
- A geometric examination of majorities based on difference in support
- Monotonicity + efficiency + continuity = majority
- Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes
- On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives
- Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support
- Resolute majority rules
- Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach
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