Stable and extremely unequal

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2023.111101MaRDI QIDQ6047334zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alfred Galichon, Octavia Ghelfi, Marc Henry

Publication date 12 September 2023

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.06587, https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03936184

zbMATH Keywords

aligned preferenceslexicographic orderstable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Abstract: We highlight the tension between stability and equality in non transferable utility matching. We consider many to one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, which in this context means that a school's utility is the sum of its students' utilities. We show that the unique stable allocation displays extreme inequality between matched pairs.

Recommendations

• Persistent Inequality
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Cites work

• Assignment Problems
• Axioms for deferred acceptance
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
• On cores and indivisibility
• On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
• Rank-maximal matchings
• Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation

Cited in

(7)

• Essentially stable matchings
• ``Sex-equal stable matchings
• Unilateral stability in matching problems
• The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
• Rawlsian matching
• Improved truthful rank approximation for rank-maximal matchings
• Stability vs. no justified envy

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