Strategy-proof aggregation of approximate and imprecise judgments

DOI10.1007/S00199-025-01666-0MaRDI QIDQ7289152zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Marcello Basili, Ernesto Savaglio, Stefano Vannucci

Publication date 2 July 2026

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00199-025-01666-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

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