The chair allocation problem

DOI10.1007/S00355-025-01630-WMaRDI QIDQ7312031zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Francis Bloch, David Cantala, Damián Gibaja

Publication date 11 August 2026

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00355-025-01630-W

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

• An analysis of the German university admissions system
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Kidney Exchange
• Matching through institutions
• Modelling practical placement of trainee teachers to schools
• Non-manipulable house allocation with rent control
• On cores and indivisibility
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
• The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives

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