The effect of loss preference on queueing with information disclosure policy
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Cites work
- A model of reference-dependent preferences
- Congestion Tolls for Poisson Queuing Processes
- Loss aversion and the uniform pricing puzzle for media and entertainment products
- Loss aversion equilibrium
- Loss Aversion with a State-Dependent Reference Point
- On the optimal disclosure of queue length information
- Optimal information disclosure policies in a strategic queueing model
- Optimal information disclosure policies in strategic queueing games
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Regular prices and sales
- Service Pricing with Loss-Averse Customers
- The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
- To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
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