Loss aversion equilibrium
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Cited in
(36)- Endogenous reference points in bargaining
- Price discrimination with loss averse consumers
- Loss aversion, habit formation and the term structures of equity and interest rates
- Credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibrium for bimatrix games with triangular fuzzy payoffs
- Prospect dynamics and loss dominance
- An index of loss aversion
- A folk theorem for endogenous reference points
- Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction
- Introduction to the special issue in honor of Peter Wakker
- Risk aversion for losses and the Nash bargaining solution
- On probabilities and loss aversion
- Asymmetric gain-loss reference dependence and attitudes toward uncertainty
- Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests
- A revealed reference point for prospect theory
- Subgame perfect equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining game with loss aversion
- Reference-dependent aggregation in multi-attribute group decision-making
- On loss aversion in bimatrix games
- Non-cooperative games with prospect theory players and dominated strategies
- Bankruptcy problems with reference-dependent preferences
- A preference foundation for constant loss aversion
- Hedonic Utility, Loss Aversion and Moral Hazard
- When normative and descriptive diverge: how to bridge the difference
- Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation
- Nonconvex equilibrium prices in prediction markets
- Equilibrium notions for agents with cumulative prospect theory preferences
- Reference dependence and market participation
- Loss Aversion with a State-Dependent Reference Point
- Games with switching costs and endogenous references
- Learning in games with cumulative prospect theoretic preferences
- The effect of loss preference on queueing with information disclosure policy
- The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution with loss aversion
- Managing anticipation and reference-dependent choice
- Coordination after gains and losses: is prospect theory's value function predictive for games?
- Reference-dependent expected utility with incomplete preferences
- Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes
- Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence
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