Calculus and extensions of Arrow's theorem

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(91)90032-OzbMath0751.90008OpenAlexW2076616008MaRDI QIDQ1176220

Donald G. Saari

Publication date: 25 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(91)90032-o

zbMATH Keywords

domain restrictionArrow's theoremdiscrete aggregationGibbard- Satterthwaite theoremsmooth aggregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

The aggregated excess demand function and other aggregation procedures ⋮ Complexity and the geometry of voting ⋮ Arrow's theorem and theory choice

Cites Work

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• Handbook of mathematical economics. Volume III
• Arrow's theorem with a fixed feasible alternative
• Symmetry, voting, and social choice
• Social choice in economic environments
• The amalgamation and geometry of two-by-two contingency tables
• A dictionary for voting paradoxes
• Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
• The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• The source of some paradoxes from social choice and probability
• Choice structures and preference relations
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria

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