A value for multichoice games

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00054-2zbMath0978.91006MaRDI QIDQ5934227

Emilio Calvo, Juan Carlos Santos

Publication date: 1 February 2002

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00054-2

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley value; Aumann-Shapley value; balanced contributions; cost allocation; multichoice games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

Related Items

Multilinear extensions and values for multichoice games, MOULIN REDUCTION, V-N REDUCTION AND AXIOMATIZATIONS OF THE DUPLICATE CORE, Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case, Converse consistent enlargements of the unit-level-core of the multi-choice games, Capital allocation for portfolios with non-linear risk aggregation, The pseudo-average rule: bankruptcy, cost allocation and bargaining, Prices in mixed cost allocation problems, The egalitarian solution for multichoice games, Multi-choice clan games and their core, Cost allocation schemes: An asymptotic approach, The generalized symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value for multichoice games with a coalition structure, The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games, The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure, The serial property and restricted balanced contributions in discrete cost sharing problems, Convex multi-choice games: characterizations and monotonic allocation schemes, Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation, The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games, Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games, The multichoice coalition value, The duplicate extension for the equal allocation of nonseparable costs, On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing, Allocation rules for multi-choice games with a permission tree structure

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