Cooperation and evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game with institutional incentives

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.030zbMath1337.91042OpenAlexW2009419750WikidataQ51539802 ScholiaQ51539802MaRDI QIDQ289453

Ross Cressman, Bo-Yu Zhang, Yi Tao, Jie-Wen Song

Publication date: 30 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.030

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationadaptive dynamicsreplicator equationpublic goods gamereward and punishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Statistical physics of human cooperation, Evolving cooperation, Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games, Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations, Game theory and the evolution of cooperation, Compulsory persistent cooperation in continuous public goods games, Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game, Rewards based on public loyalty program promote cooperation in public goods game, Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions, Evolutionary dynamics of zero-determinant strategies in repeated multiplayer games, The replicator equation and other game dynamics, Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation, The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation, Shared rewarding overcomes defection traps in generalized volunteer's dilemmas

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