Strategic decentralization in binary choice composite congestion games
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Publication:322512
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2015.09.026zbMath1346.91024arXiv1506.03479OpenAlexW1790671212MaRDI QIDQ322512
Publication date: 7 October 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.03479
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10)
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Cites Work
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