Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.004zbMath1372.91010OpenAlexW3125875351MaRDI QIDQ337814

Katsunori Ohta, Hajime Kobayashi, Tadashi Sekiguchi

Publication date: 3 November 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/DP/DP650.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamessharing ruleimperfect public monitoringoptimal equilibriumpartnerships

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Sharing sequential values in a network

Cites Work

• Limit games and limit equilibria
• The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams

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