Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium
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Publication:361802
DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0293-7zbMath1304.91039arXiv1002.4577OpenAlexW1563707431MaRDI QIDQ361802
Publication date: 19 August 2013
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1002.4577
2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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