Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:417620
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.014zbMath1258.91121MaRDI QIDQ417620
Serene Tan, Nicolas L. Jacquet
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2003
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