Paying attention to payoffs in analogy-based learning
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Publication:420991
DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0565-7zbMath1258.91036OpenAlexW2130448274MaRDI QIDQ420991
Publication date: 23 May 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hasite/papers/hasite0007.pdf
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