Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games
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Publication:476147
DOI10.1007/s00199-014-0846-7zbMath1319.91020OpenAlexW2261338879MaRDI QIDQ476147
Jan-Philip Gamp, Sonja Brangewitz
Publication date: 28 November 2014
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2902163
Related Items
Cites Work
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