The rights egalitarian solution for NTU sharing problems

DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0177-2zbMath1211.91036OpenAlexW2032835604MaRDI QIDQ532717

Antonio Villar, Carmen Herrero

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ0901.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

NTU problemsrights egalitarian solutionsharing problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (5)

Bankruptcy problems with reference-dependent preferences ⋮ The tempered aspirations solution for bargaining problems with a reference point ⋮ Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points ⋮ Bargaining with independence of higher or irrelevant claims ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update

Cites Work

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• Endogenous reference points and the adjusted proportional solution for bargaining problems with claims
• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
• A comparison of non-transferable utility values
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• The Bargaining Problem
• An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution
• On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Bargaining and Value
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
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