Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games
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Publication:536102
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.003zbMath1236.91037MaRDI QIDQ536102
Muhamet Yildiz, Jonathan Weinstein
Publication date: 16 May 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.003
91A44: Games involving topology, set theory, or logic
91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)
91B44: Economics of information
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