Effective game matrix and inclusive payoff in group-structured populations

DOI10.1007/s13235-011-0014-7zbMath1261.91007OpenAlexW1979707124MaRDI QIDQ692091

Sabin Lessard

Publication date: 4 December 2012

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0014-7

zbMATH Keywords

inclusive fitnessevolutionary gamegroup selectionmatrix gamerelatednessfinite-island model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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